In this paper, first, we investigate the model of degraded broadcast channel with side information and confidential messages. This work is from Steinberg's work on the degraded broadcast channel with causal and noncausal side information, and Csiszár-Körner's work on broadcast channel with confidential messages. Inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions are provided for the noncausal and causal cases. Superposition coding and double-binning technique are used in the corresponding achievability proofs.
wiretapper as ignorant of the messages as possible. After the publication of Wyner's work, Csiszár and Körner [4] investigated a more general situation: the broadcast channels with confidential messages, see Figure 1 . The model of [4] is to transmit confidential messages to receiver 1 at rate R 1 and common messages to both receivers at rate R 0 , while keeping receiver 2 as ignorant of the confidential messages as possible. Measuring ignorance by equivocation, a single-letter characterization of all the achievable triples (R 1 , R e , R 0 ) was provided in [4] , where R e is the second receiver's equivocation to the confidential messages. Note that the model of [4] is also a generalization of [8] , where no confidentiality condition is imposed. In addition, Merhav [11] studied a specified wiretap channel, and obtained the capacity region, where both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper have access to some leaked symbols from the source, but the channels for the wiretapper are more noisy than the legitimate receiver, which shares a secret key with the encoder.
Fig. 1: Broadcast channels with confidential messages
In communication systems there is often a feedback link from the receiver to the transmitter,e.g. the two-way channels for telephone connections. It is well known that feedback does not increase the capacity of discrete memoryless channel (DMC). However, does the feedback increase the capacity region of the wiretap channel? In order to solve this problem, Ahlswede and Cai studied the general wiretap channel (the wiretap channel does not need to be degraded) with noiseless feedback from the legitimate receiver [1] , and both upper and lower bounds of the secrecy capacity were provided. Specifically, for the degraded case, they showed that the secrecy capacity is larger than that of Wyner's wiretap channel (without feedback). In the achievability proof, Ahlswede and Cai [1] used the noiseless feedback as a secret key shared by the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, while the wiretapper had no additional knowledge about the key except his own received symbols. Besides Ahlswede and Cai's work, the wiretap channel with noisy feedback was studied in [10] , and the wiretap channel with secure rate-limited feedback was studied in [2] , and both of them focused on bounds of the secrecy capacity.
The coding for channels with causal side information at the encoder was first investigated by Shannon [13] in 1958. After that, in order to solve the problem of coding for a computer memory with defective cells, Kuznetsov and Tsybakov [9] considered a channel in the presence of noncausal side information at the transmitter. They provided some coding techniques without determination of the capacity. The capacity was found in 1980 by Gel'fand and Pinsker [7] . Furthermore, Costa [6] investigated a power-constrained additive noise channel, where part of the noise is known at the transmitter as side information. This channel is also called dirty paper channel. Based on the dirty paper channel, C. Mitrpant et al. [12] studied the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, and provided an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region. Furthermore, Y. Chen et al. [3] investigated the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with noncausal side information, and also provided an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region. Note that the coding scheme of [3] is a combination of those in [7] , [15] . In order to introduce side information to the broadcast channel, Steinberg investigated the degraded broadcast channel with side information [14] , where both causal and noncausal side information were considered in his paper. Specifically, inner and outer bounds on capacity region were provided for the degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14] , and meanwhile, the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel with causal side information was totally determined [14] .
In this paper, we study the model of degraded broadcast channel with side information, confidential messages and with or without noiseless feedback (see Figure 2) . The model of this paper is from Steinberg's work on degraded broadcast channel with side information at the encoder, and the model of broadcast channel with confidential messages provided by Csiszár and Körner. In Figure 2 , S is the confidential message sent to receiver 1, and T is the common message sent to both receiver 1 and receiver 2. The transition probability of channel 1 depends on the side information V N , and V N is available to the channel encoder in a causal or noncausal manner. Receiver 2 can get a degraded version of Y N via channel 2. In addition, there may exist a noiseless feedback from the output of channel 1 to the channel encoder. . Let p V (v) denote the probability mass function P r{V = v}. Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions of the model of Figure 2 In this subsection, a description of the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and without feedback is given by Definition 1 to Definition 5. The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R (n) composed of all achievable (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) triples are in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, where the achievable
is defined in Definition 6.
Definition 1: (Channel encoder) The confidential message S takes values in S, and the common message T takes values in T . S and T are independent and uniformly distributed over their ranges. V N is the side information of channel 1, and it is the output of a discrete memoryless source p V (v). In addition, V N is available to the channel encoder in a noncausal manner. Note that V N is independent of S and T . At the i-th time, the inputs of the channel encoder are S, T and V N , while the output is X i , i.e., the channel encoder is a mapping
where f i (s, t, v N ) = x i ∈ X , s ∈ S, t ∈ T and v N ∈ V N . The transmission rates of the confidential message and the common message are log S N and log T N , respectively.
Definition 2: (Channel 1) Channel 1 is a DMC with finite input alphabet X × V, finite output alphabet Y, and transition probability Q 1 (y|x, v), where
The inputs of Channel 1 are X N and V N , while the output is Y N .
Definition 3: (Channel 2) Channel 2 is a DMC with finite input alphabet Y, finite output alphabet Z, and transition probability Q 2 (z|y), where
The inputs of Channel 2 is Y N , while the output is Z N . Receiver 2's equivocation to the confidential message is defined as
2)
The cascade of Channel 1 and Channel 2 is another DMC with transition probability
Definition 4: (Decoder 1) Decoder 1 is a mapping f D1 : Y N → S × T , with input Y N and outputs S, T . Let P e1 be the error probability of receiver 1 , and it is defined as P r{(S, T ) = ( S, T )}.
Definition 5: (Decoder 2) Decoder 2 is a mapping f D2 : Z N → T , with input Z N and output T . Let P e2 be the error probability of receiver 2 , and it is defined as P r{T = T }.
Definition 6: (Achievable (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) triple in the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and without feedback) A triple (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) (where R 0 , R 1 , R e > 0) is called achievable if, for any > 0 (where is an arbitrary small positive real number and → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, ∆,
The following Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R (n) for the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and without feedback, and they are proved in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Theorem 1: A single-letter characterization of the region R (ni) is as follows,
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
• The region R (ni) is convex, and the proof is directly obtained by introducing a time sharing random variable into Theorem 1, and therefore, we omit the proof here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
The proof is in Appendix C.
• Without the secrecy parameter R e , the region R (ni) is exactly the same as the achievable region for the degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14] .
• The points in R (n) for which R e = R 1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|Z N ).
Definition 7: (The secrecy capacity C (n)
s ) The secrecy capacity C (n) s of the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and without feedback, is denoted by
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity
Proof of (2.6): Substituting R e = R 1 and R 0 = 0 into the region R (ni) in Theorem 1, we have
Note that the triple
is achievable, and therefore, the secrecy capacity
Thus the proof is completed.
Theorem 2: A single-letter characterization of the region R (no) is as follows,
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 2, see the following.
• The region R (no) is convex, and the proof is directly obtained by introducing a time sharing random variable into Theorem 2, and therefore, we omit the proof here.
The proof is similar to the proof of the second part of Remark 1, and it is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter R e , the region R (no) is exactly the same as the outer bound for the degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14] .
B. The Model of Figure 2 with Causal Side Information and without Feedback
The model of Figure 2 with causal side information and without feedback is similar to the model in Subsection II-A, except that the side information V N in Definition 1 is known to the channel encoder in a causal manner, i.e., at the i-th time (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the output of the channel encoder
The following Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R (c) for the model of Figure 2 with causal side information and without feedback, and they are proved in Appendix D and Appendix E.
Theorem 3: A single-letter characterization of the region R (ci) is as follows,
Remark 3: There are some notes on Theorem 3, see the following.
• The region R (ci) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter R e , the region R (ci) is exactly the same as the capacity region for the degraded broadcast channel with causal side information [14] .
• The points in R (c) for which R e = R 1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|Z N ). Proof of (2.11): Substituting R e = R 1 and R 0 = 0 into the region R (ci) in Theorem 3, we have
Note that the triple (R 0 = 0, R 1 = max(I(K; Y |U ) − I(K; Z|U )), R e = R 1 ) is achievable, and therefore, the secrecy capacity C (c) s ≥ max(I(K; Y |U ) − I(K; Z|U )). Thus the proof is completed.
Theorem 4: A single-letter characterization of the region R (co) is as follows,
Remark 4: There are some notes on Theorem 4, see the following.
• The region R (co) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter R e , the region R (co) is exactly the same as the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel with causal side information [14] .
III. THE MODEL OF FIGURE 2 WITH FEEDBACK
In this section, the model of Figure 2 with feedback is considered into two parts. The model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and feedback is described in Subsection III-A, and the model of Figure 2 with causal side information and feedback is described in Subsection III-B, see the following. 
where
The following Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R (nf ) for the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and feedback, and they are proved in Appendix F and Appendix G.
Theorem 5: A single-letter characterization of the region R (nf i) is as follows,
Remark 5: There are some notes on Theorem 5, see the following.
• The region R (nf i) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy U ≤ X V + 2,
• Without the secrecy parameter R e , the region R (nf i) is exactly the same as the achievable region for the degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14] .
• The points in R (nf ) for which R e = R 1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|Z N ). 
Proof of (3.14): Substituting R e = R 1 and R 0 = 0 into the region R (nf i) in Theorem 5, we have
and therefore, the secrecy capacity
• Note that the formula R e ≤ I(K; Y |U ) − I(K; Z|U ) of Theorem 1 can be bounded as follows.
Formula (3.15) implies that the feedback helps to enlarge the region R (ni) in Theorem 1.
Theorem 6: A single-letter characterization of the region R (nf o) is as follows,
Remark 6: There are some notes on Theorem 6, see the following.
• The region R (nf o) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter R e , the region R (nf o) is exactly the same as the outer bound for the degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14] .
B. The Model of Figure 2 with Causal Side Information and Feedback
The model of Figure 2 with causal side information and feedback is similar to the model in Subsection III-A, except that the side information V N is known to the channel encoder in a causal manner, i.e., at the i-th time
(1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the output of the channel encoder
.., v i ) and f i is the mapping at time i.
The following Theorem 7 provides the capacity-equivocation region R (cf ) for the model of Figure 2 with causal side information and feedback, and it is proved in Appendix H.
Theorem 7:
A single-letter characterization of the capacity-equivocation region R (cf ) is as follows,
and V is independent of U and K.
Remark 7:
There are some notes on Theorem 7, see the following.
• The region R (cf ) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter R e , the region R (cf ) is exactly the same as the capacity region for the degraded broadcast channel with causal side information [14] , i.e., the noiseless feedback can not increase the capacity of the degraded broadcast channel with causal side information.
• The points in R (cf ) for which R e = R 1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|Z N ). 
Proof of (3.17): Substituting R e = R 1 and R 0 = 0 into the region R (cf ) in Theorem 7, we have
By using (3.16), (3.18) and (3.19), (3.17) is proved.
• By using the same formula as (3.15), it is easy to see that the feedback helps to enlarge the region R (ci) in Theorem 3.
IV. A BINARY EXAMPLE FOR THE MODEL OF FIGURE 2 WITH CAUSAL SIDE INFORMATION AND NOISELESS

FEEDBACK
In this section, we calculate the secrecy capacity of a special case of the model of Figure 2 with causal side information and noiseless feedback.
Suppose that the channel state information V N is available at the channel encoder in a casual manner, and the random variable V is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}, i.e., p
Meanwhile, the random variables X, Y and Z take values in {0, 1}, and channel 2 is a BSC (binary symmetric channel) with crossover probability q. The transition probability of channel 1 is defined as follows:
otherwise.
(4.1)
From Remark 7 we know that the secrecy capacity for the causal case is Let K take values in {0, 1}. The probability of K is defined as follows.
In addition, define the conditional probability mass function p X|K,V as follows.
The character I(K; Y ) depends on the joint probability mass functions p KY , and we have
Now we calculate max I(K; Y ) and max H(Y |Z), respectively.
• (Calculation of max I(K; Y )) Since
and
Define β 1 − β 2 = a and β 3 − β 4 = b, then we have
where Thus, the secrecy capacity of this special case is For the feedback model, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are provided for the noncausal case, and the capacity-equivocation region is determined for the causal case. In the corresponding achievability proofs, the noiseless feedback is used as a secret key shared by receiver 1 and transmitter, and therefore, the coding schemes for the achievability proofs are a combination of superposition coding, Gel'fand-Pinsker's binning, block
Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai's secret key on the feedback system.
Finally, we give an example on calculating the secrecy capacity of the binary degraded broadcast channel with causal side information, confidential messages and noiseless feedback.
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APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we will show that any triple (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) ∈ R ni is achievable. Superposition coding, Gel'fandPinsker's binning and Wyner's random binning technique are used in the construction of the code-books.
Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. The code construction is in Subsection A-A. The proof of achievability is given in Subsection A-B.
A. Code Construction
Since R e ≤ I(K; Y |U ) − I(K; Z|U ) and
is achievable, and note that this implies that
Given a triple (R 0 , R 1 , R e ), choose a joint probability mass function
The confidential message set S and the common message set T satisfy the following conditions:
where γ and γ 1 are fixed positive real numbers and
Note that (a) is from
Code-book generation:
• (Construction of U N ) Gel'fand-Pinsker's binning technique is used in the construction of U N , see Figure 3 . For a given common message t (t ∈ T ) and side information v N , try to find a sequence in bin t
. If multiple such sequences in bin t exist, choose the one with the smallest i * . If no such i * exists, then declare an encoding error. For the transmitted sequence u
Distribute these sequences at random into 
Here note that the number of the sequences in every subbin is upper bounded as follows.
where (a) is from (15) . This implies that
For a given confidential message s (s ∈ S) and side information v N , try to find a sequence k
. If multiple such sequences in bin s exist, choose the one with the smallest index in the bin. If no such sequence exists, declare an encoding error. • (Construction of X N ) The x N is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with
and output x N . The transition probability of this new DMC is p X|U,K,V (x|u, k, v), which is obtained from the joint probability mass function p U,K,V,X,Y,Z (u, k, v, x, y, z). The probability
is calculated as follows.
Decoding:
Receiver 2: Given a vector z N ∈ Z N , try to find a sequence u After decoding u N (t,î) andt, try to find a sequence k
If there exist sequences with the same index of the binŝ, put out the correspondingŝ. Otherwise, declare a decoding error.
B. Proof of Achievability
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that lim N →∞ log T N = R 0 and lim N →∞ log S N = R 1 .
Then, note that the above encoding and decoding scheme is similar to the one used in [14] . Hence, by similar arguments as in [14] , it is easy to show that P e1 ≤ and P e2 ≤ , and the proof is omitted here. It remains to
show that lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e , see the following.
where (a) is from (S,
. generated random vectors, and the channels are discrete memoryless, (e) is from (16) and (18), and (f) is from 3,N → 0 as N → ∞.
Thus, lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e is proved, and the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2: all the achievable (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) triples are contained in the set R (no) . Suppose
is achievable, i.e., for any given > 0, there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, ∆,
Then we will show the existence of random variables
Since S and T are independent and uniformly distributed over S and T , we have H(S) = log S and H(T ) = log T . The formulas (22), (23), (24) and (25) 
where δ(P e1 ) = h(P e1 ) + P e1 log(|S × T | − 1) and δ(P e2 ) = h(P e2 ) + P e2 log(|T | − 1). Note that h(P e1 ) = −P e1 log P e1 − (1 − P e1 ) log(1 − P e1 ) and h(P e2 ) = −P e2 log P e2 − (1 − P e2 ) log(1 − P e2 ). (26), (27), (28) and (29), and using the fact that → 0, the formulas (22), (23), (24) and (25) are obtained. The formula (21) is
Substituting H(S) = log S , H(T ) = log T , H(S, T ) = H(S) + H(T ) and (2.4) into
It remains to prove Lemma 1, see the following.
Proof of Lemma 1: The formula (26) follows from (30), (34) and (44). The formula (27) is from (31), (36) and (48). The formula (28) is from (32), (38) and (49). The formula (29) is proved by (33), (36), (39), (48) and (50).
<Part i> We begin with the left parts of the inequalities (26), (27), (28) and (29), see the following.
Since T → Y N → Z N is a Markov chain, for the common message T , we have
For the confidential message S, we have
For S and T , we have
For the equivocation to the receiver 2, we have
Note that (a), (b), (c) and (d) follow from Fano's inequality.
<Part ii> By using chain rule, the character I(Z N ; T ) in formula (30) can be bounded as follows,
where formula (1) follows from that V i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) are i.i.d. random variables and they are independent of T , formula (2) follows from that
and formula (3) follows from that V i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) are i.i.d. random variables.
<Part iii> Using chain rule, the character I(S; Y N |T ) in formulas (31) and (33) can be rewritten as follows,
where formula (a) follows from V i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) are i.i.d. random variables and they are independent of T , S,
formula (c) follows from (35), and formula (d) is from the Markov chains
<Part iv> Similar to (34), the character I(S, T ; Y N ) in formula (32) can be rewritten as follows,
<Part v> Similar to (36), the character I(S; Z N |T ) in formula (33) can be rewritten as follows,
<Part vi> (single letter) To complete the proof, we introduce a random variable J, which is independent of S,
<Part vii> Then (34) can be rewritten as
where (a) follows from the fact that V J is independent of J.
Proof of p(V
Since V N is the output of a discrete memoryless source
From <Part vi>, we know that the random variable J is independent of V N , and therefore,
where (1) follows from (45).
On the other hand, the probability p(V J = v) can be calculated as follows,
where (a) is from that J is independent of V N , the formula (b) is from (45).
By using (46) and (47), it is easy to verify that V J is independent of J, completing the proof.
Analogously, (36) is rewritten as follows,
where (a) follows from (40) , (41), (42) and (43).
Similarly, (38) is rewritten as follows,
and (39) can be rewritten as follows,
Substituting (44), (48), (49), (50) into (30), (31), (32) and (33), Lemma 1 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX C SIZE CONSTRAINT OF THE RANDOM VARIABLES IN THEOREM 1
By using the support lemma (see [5] , p.310), it suffices to show that the random variables U and K can be replaced by new ones, preserving the Markovity (U, K) → (X, V ) → Y → Z and the mutual information I(U ; Z), I(U ; V ), I(K; Y |U ), I(K; V |U ), I(K; Z|U ), and furthermore, the ranges of the new U and K satisfy: U ≤ X V +2,
The proof is in the reminder of this section.
Define the following continuous scalar functions ofp :
Since there are X V − 1 functions of f XV (p), the total number of the continuous scalar functions ofp is X V +2.
According to the support lemma ( [5] , p.310), the random variable U can be replaced by new ones such that the new U takes at most X V + 2 different values and the expressions (52), (53), (54) and (55) are preserved.
Once the alphabet of U is fixed, we apply similar arguments to bound the alphabet of K, see the following.
Define X V + 2 continuous scalar functions ofp XV :
where of the functions f XV (p XV ), only X V − 1 are to be considered.
For every fixed u, letp XV |K = P r{X = x, V = v|K = k}. With these distributionsp XV |K , we have
By the support lemma ( [5] , p.310), for every fixed u, the size of the alphabet of the random variable K can not be larger than X V + 2, and therefore, K ≤ ( X V + 2) 2 is proved.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this section, we will show that any triple (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) ∈ R ci is achievable. Superposition coding and Wyner's random binning techniques are used in the construction of the code-books. 
A. Code Construction
Since R e ≤ I(K; Y |U ) − I(K; Z|U ) and R e ≤ R 1 ≤ I(K; Y |U ), it is sufficient to show that the triple
is achievable, and note that this implies that R 1 ≥ R e = I(K; Y |U ) −
I(K; Z|U ).
where γ and γ 1 are fixed numbers and γ ≥ 0,
Note that (a) is from R 1 ≥ R e = I(K; Y |U ) − I(K; Z|U ) and (60). Let S = {1, 2, ..., 2 N R1 } and T = {1, 2, ..., 2 N R0 }.
For a given common message t (t ∈ T ), generate a corresponding sequence u N (t) i.i.d. according to the probability mass function p U (u). For the transmitted sequence u
k N , according to the probability mass function p K|U (k i |u i (t)). Distribute these sequences at random into
Here note that the number of the sequences in every bin is upper bounded as follows.
where (a) is from (62). This implies that
For a given confidential message s (s ∈ S), randomly choose a sequence k N (u N (t)) in bin s for transmission.
• (Construction of X N ) The x N is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with inputs k N , u N , v N , and output x N . The transition probability of this new DMC is p X|U,K,V (x|u, k, v). The
Receiver 2: Given a vector z N ∈ Z N , try to find a sequence u
If there exists a unique sequence, put out the correspondingt. Otherwise, declare a decoding error.
Receiver 1: Given a vector y N ∈ Y N , try to find a sequence u
If such a sequence does not exist, or there are more than one such sequence, declare a decoding error. Denote the corresponding sequence by u N (t), put out the corresponding indext.
After decoding u N (t) andt, try to find a sequence k
B. Proof of Achievability
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that lim N →∞ log T N = R 0 and lim N →∞
. generated random vectors, and the channels are discrete memoryless, and (d) is from (64).
Thus, lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e is proved, and the proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 4: all the achievable (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) triples are contained in the set R (co) . Suppose
The formula (67) is from
Since the model of Figure 2 with causal side information is a special case of the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information, the formulas (68), (69) and (70) are obtained from (71), (72) and (73), respectively, see the following.
Proof of (68): The parameter R 0 of (68) can be written as follows,
where (a) follows from (30) and (34), and V i is independent of (Z i−1 , T, V Proof of (69): The parameter R 1 of (69) can be written follows,
where (1) follows from (31), the formula (2) is from (36) and the fact that I(S;
N and Z N , and J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N }) and the fact that → 0. Thus, the formula (69) is proved.
Proof of (70):
The parameter R e of (70) satisfies
where (a) follows from (33), the formula (b) is from (36) and (39), and the fact that V i is independent of
, and the fact that P e1 , P e2 ≤ → 0. Thus, the proof of (70) is completed.
The proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 5
In this section, we will show that any triple (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) ∈ R nf i is achievable. Superposition coding, Gel'fandPinsker's binning, block Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai's secret key on feedback [1] are used in the construction of the code-books. In addition, the encoding and decoding scheme for Theorem 5 can be also viewed as a combination of Steinberg's method [14] , block Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai's secret key on feedback [1] .
Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. The code construction is in Subsection F-A. The proof of achievability is given in Subsection F-B.
A. Code Construction
Given a triple (R 0 , R 1 , R e ), choose a joint probability mass function p U,K,V,X,Y,Z (u, k, v, x, y, z) such that
where γ and γ 1 are fixed positive real numbers. Let S = {1, 2, ..., 2 N R1 } and T = {1, 2, ..., 2 N R0 }.
We use the block Markov coding method. The random vectors
blocks of length N . The common message for n blocks is T n (T 1 , ..., T n ), which is composed of n i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed over T . The confidential message for n blocks is S n (S 2 , S 3 , ..., S n ), where S i (2 ≤ i ≤ n) are i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed over S. Note that in the first block, there is no S 1 .
is the output of channel 1 for block i. The specific values of the above random vectors are denoted by lower case letters.
The construction of U N for each block is exactly the same as that in the proof of Theorem 1, see the following.
For the i-th block (
to the probability mass function p U (u). Distribute these sequences at random into 2 N R0 = 2
bins such that each bin contains 2 N (I(U ;V )+γ− 1,N ) sequences. Index each bin by t i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2 N R0 }.
For a given common message t i (t i ∈ T ) and side information v N , try to find a sequence in bin
. If multiple such sequences in bin t i exist, choose the one with the smallest j * .
If no such j * exists, then declare an encoding error.
• (Construction of K N )
Superposition coding, Gel'fand-Pinsker's binning, block Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai's secret key on feedback [1] are used in the construction of K N , see Figure 6 . In the first block, for a given side information v N , try to find a k
If multiple such sequences exist, randomly choose one for transmission. If no such sequence exists, declare an encoding error.
For the i-th block (2 ≤ i ≤ n), firstly we generate a mapping g f :
, which is uniformly distributed over S, and K * i is independent of S i . Reveal the mapping g f to both receivers and the transmitter.
Then, when the transmitter receives the output y i−1 of the i-1-th block, he computes k * i = g f ( y i−1 ) ∈ S. For a given s i , the transmitter chooses a sequence k
If multiple such sequences in bin s i ⊕ k * i exist, choose the one with the smallest index in the bin. If no such sequence exists, declare an encoding error.
• (Construction of X N ) For each block, the x N is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with inputs k N , u N , v N , and output x N . The transition probability of this new DMC is p X|U,K,V (x|u, k, v). The probability
Receiver 2: For each block, given a vector z N ∈ Z N , try to find a sequence u
If there exist sequences with the samet, put out the correspondingt. Otherwise, i.e., if no such sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error. After decoding u N (t i ,ĵ) andt i , try to find a sequence k 
B. Proof of Achievability
The rate of the confidential message S n is defined as
and it satisfies
Similarly, the rate of the common messages T n satisfies
In addition, note that the encoding and decoding scheme for Theorem 5 is exactly the same as that in [14] , except that the transmitted message for receiver 1 is s ⊕ k * . Since receiver 1 knows k * , the decoding scheme for Theorem 5 is in fact the same as that in [14] . Hence, we omit the proof of P e1 ≤ and P e2 ≤ here.
It remains to show that lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e , see the following.
Since the confidential message S is encrypted by S⊕K * , the equivocation about S is equivalent to the equivocation about K * . There are two ways for receiver 2 to obtain the secret key k * . One way is that he tries to guess the k * from its alphabet S. The other way is that he tries to guess the feedback y First, we will show that K * i ⊕ S i is independent of K * i and S i , and this is used in the proof of lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e . Since K * i is independent of S i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), and all of them are uniformly distributed over S, the fact that K * ⊕ S i is independent of K * and S i is proved by the following (80) and (81).
Then, lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e is proved by the following (82).
where (a) is from In this section, we prove Theorem 6: all the achievable (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) triples are contained in the set R (nf o) .
Suppose (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) is achievable, i.e., for any given > 0, there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, ∆, P e1 , P e2 )
such that
The proof of (83), (84), (85) and (86) are the same as those in the proof of Theorem 2, and therefore, we omit it here. It remains to prove (87), see the following.
where ( The proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
APPENDIX H PROOF OF THEOREM 7
A. Converse Part of Theorem 7
The converse proof of Theorem 7 is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 4, except that R e ≤ H(Y |Z).
Note that the proof of R e ≤ H(Y |Z) is the same as that in the proof of Theorem 6, and hence we omit the proof here.
B. Direct Part of Theorem 7
In this section, we will show that any triple (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) ∈ R cf is achievable. The confidential message set S and the common message set T satisfy the following conditions:
where γ and γ 1 are fixed positive numbers. Let S = {1, 2, ..., 2 N R1 } and T = {1, 2, ..., 2 N R0 }. Code-book generation:
The construction of U N for each block is exactly the same as that in the proof of Theorem 3, see the following.
For the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), given a common message t i (t i ∈ T ), generate a corresponding u N (t i ) i.i.d.
according to the probability mass function p U (u).
In the first block, for a given u N (t 1 ), generate a corresponding sequence k N i.i.d. according to the probability mass function p K|U (k i |u i ).
In the i-th block (2 ≤ i ≤ n), firstly we generate a mapping g f : Y N → S. Define a random variable
, which is uniformly distributed over S, and K * i is independent of S i . Reveal the mapping g f to both receivers and the transmitter. Then, when the transmitter receives the output y i−1 of the i-1-th block, he computes k Given the transmitted sequence u N (t i ) and the encrypted confidential message s i ⊕ k * i (where ⊕ is the modulo addition over S), generate a corresponding sequence k N i.i.d. according to the probability mass function p K|U (k i |u i ). Index k N by s i ⊕ k * i ∈ S.
• (Construction of X N )
For each block, the x N is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with inputs k N , u N , v N , and output x N . The transition probability of this new DMC is p X|U,K,V (x|u, k, v). The probability
Receiver 2: For each block, given a vector z N ∈ Z N , try to find a sequence u N (t) such that (u N (t), z N ) ∈ 2) Proof of Achievability: Note that the encoding and decoding scheme for Theorem 7 is exactly the same as that in [14] , except that the transmitted message for receiver 1 is s ⊕ k * . Since receiver 1 knows k * , the decoding scheme for Theorem 7 is in fact the same as that in [14] . Hence, we omit the proof of P e1 ≤ and P e2 ≤ here.
Since the confidential message S is encrypted by S⊕K * , the equivocation about S is equivalent to the equivocation about K * . There are two ways for receiver 2 to obtain the secret key k * . One way is that he tries to guess the k * from its alphabet S. The other way is that he tries to guess the feedback y N (y N is the output of channel 1 for the previous block, and k * = g f (y N )) from the conditional typical set T The detail about the proof of lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e is exactly the same as (82), and it is omitted here.
Thus, lim N →∞ ∆ ≥ R e is proved, and the direct part of Theorem 7 is completed.
The proof of Theorem 7 is completed.
